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8th ed. by Walter Carrington. LitPp. ccii, xix, 1565.
It would be a very difficult task to bring down to date effectively any legal
treatise, written more than fifty years ago, without entirely rewriting it. In
the field of constitutional law this is quite impossible, as is evidenced by the
work under review. Judge Cooley has his established place as a writer on the
Constitution and his writings will always be of value to students in that field,
for his interpretation of the Constitution and for his discussion of problems
which had arisen in his day; but a vast amount of constitutional law has
been made in the last half-century and problems have come to the fore of
which he never thought. The effort by successive authors to fit this new
material into the old framework becomes less satisfactory with each attempt.
We have as a result such cumbersome footnotes as that to the full faith and
credit clause on page 57, which covers seven pages double column, and that
commencing on page 38 and covering six pages double column, dealing with
the acceptance by the federal courts of the state decisions as to state law.
Such examples might be multiplied indefinitely. New matter is also introduced into the text by the use of extended brackets. The whole effect is
awkward and disjointed.
One should not expect a treatise in any field of law to be a digest of
all of the relevant cases, but we are assured in the preface to the present edition of Judge Cooley's book that "a careful selection has been made of all
important cases that are within the purview of the treatise as defined by Judge
Cooley in his preface to the second edition. These include all such cases reported prior to June 1, 1926." One does not however, find Murphy v. Sardell,
holding state minimum wage laws invalid, following the decision as to the Dis2
trict of Columbia legislation in Adkins v. Childrens Hospital. Terrall v. Burke
Construction Co.,' which repudiates the doctrine that a license to a foreign
corporation might be granted upon condition that it would be withdrawn if
resort by the corporation was had to the federal courts, is not cited. Doyle
v. Continental Insurance Co.,' and Security Mutual Insurance Co. v. Prezeitt,'
which are overruled by the later case, are not cited for the particular point
which they decided, but only for the general proposition that a license to a
foreign corporation to do business may be withdrawn at will. Carroll v. United
States,' is cited for the proposition that "where a man is legally arrested for
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an offense whatever is found on his person or under his control which it is
unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be
seized and held as evidence in the prosecution"' (p. 616) and nowhere does
the editor discuss the point which the case really decided, namely, that an
automobile may be searched upon reasonable suspicion without a warrant.
The question who are citizens, including the effect of marriage upon citizenship, is not described; naturalization has a short footnote; expatriation is
not found in the index. There is no discussion of the constitutional law with
regard to Indians, and there are only three footnote references to this subject. Federal aid legislation, with its important possibilities, is not mentioned.
The possibility of encroachment upon the normal state powers through the use
of the treaty-making power is not referred to. The possibilities lying in the
constitutional provision for interstate compacts, with the consent of Congress,
are not considered or even suggested, notwithstanding the successful operaion of such a compact between New York and New Jersey setting up the New
York Port Authority, the compact between New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, with regard to the Delaware River, and the proposed Colorado River
compact to involve six or possibly seven states.
Cooley on Constitutional Limitations will continue to be an important
book of reference for the student of constitutional law and constitutional history, but if another effort is made to bring this treatise down to date it is to
be hoped that in the process it will be entirely revised and rewritten, the
material which has been added from time to time worked into an harmonious
whole, each subject carefully restudied, and the present gaps filled in.
Charles K. Burdick.
Dean, Cornell University Law School.

OUTLrNE OF SURErySHIP AND GUARANTY.
Co., Chicago, 1927. Pp. xvi, 620.

By Earl C. Arnold. Callaghan &

The title of this treatise is too modest. It is more than an outline. Perhaps it is for this very reason that a reviewer in lobking over its pages may
be tempted to offer the criticism that its very compactness of material may
be at times a source of confusion to the uninitiated. There are so many subtle
distinctions in the law of suretyship and guaranty that too much brevity of
treatment may be worse than no treatment at all. It requires consummate skill
of authorship to condense into five hundred pages material which could without reproach be expanded into a thousand. The arrangement of the contents
is excellent. The treatment of the "Statute of Limitations" and the "Effect
of Bankruptcy" in separate chapters is particularly timely and helpful.
This book should be a great aid to the law student to whom, frequently,
some of the principles of suretyship seem hopelessly befogged, for the author's
elucidation is clear and in language which the student can readily understand.
To the reviewer, the book in spots has the defect of a lack of proper
emphasis. Few students have the capacity to discriminate between that which
is important and that which is only incidental, that which is firmly established

626

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

and that which has hardly passed beyond the stage of the tentative. It is a
great help to have these distinctions brought to his attention.
Here and there the author allows a passion for dialectic to run away with
his sense of values as, for instance in what seems his overtreatment of a
promise to the surety of indemnity given by a stranger. Green v. Creswell,'
Thomas v. Cook' and the long line of cases succeeding them offer an opportunity for endless discussion. The correctness of the established rule must
rest primarily on what construction is to be placed upon the promise of indemnity, i. e., does the debtor agree to indemnify the surety or guarantor unconditionally or only if his principal fails to do so? The incident that the principal is bound to indemnify his surety is not of itself determinative of the
nature of the debtor's promise. The dependency of his promise upon the
obligation of the principal to indemnify gives the clue to the answer. This
query the author in his eagerness to support Green v. Creswell does not even
postulate. But these are minor defects in a treatise that should be valuable
not only to the law student but also to the practitioner. It would be a captious
critic indeed who would withhold from the author praise for a task carefully
conceived and skillfully executed.
Charles G. Little.
Chicago.

CASES ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE.

Publishing Co., St. Paul.

By Harold R. Medina. West

1926. Pp. x, 674.

The attempt to review a case-book prepared primarily for classroom use,
without having actually made such use of it, is always more or less unsatisfactory. The teachability of particular cases can rarely be accurately guaged
until they have been presented and discussed in the class-room; indeed, the
full value of a case is sometimes not appreciated until it has been so used
for several years. However, there are several other standards by which a
case-book can be judged, which, fortunately for the reviewer of new works, do
not require actual use as a condition to a fairly accurate conclusion as to the
probable value of the work.
The author of the work under consideration points out in his prefacebut with a conservation of statement which conveys a very inadequate idea
of its present importance-the present "commanding position" occupied by
the federal courts with respect to a great many "ordinary litigated matters."
Time was, and not so many years ago either, when the average lawyer looked
upon the federal court as the vassals of medieval England doubtless looked
upon the Curia Regis-as a court for great men and great causes.
Cases
in the lower federal courts were considered so rare in the practice of the
average small town lawyer-and after all it is principally average small town
lawyers that are being turned out by most law schools-that familiarity with
IlO Ad. & E. 453 (1839).
28 B. & C. 728 (1828).
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federal procedure was hardly deemed necessary. When forced by circumstances or a more alert opponent to try a case in the federal court, the lawyer
usually stumbled through it giving thanks for the conformity act and cussing
Congress for the phrase "as near as may be" therein. A case in the Supreme
Court of the United States was looked upon as the crowning feature of a
successful career at the bar-a prospect to be viewed with mixed emotions of
satisfaction and foreboding; of pride and trepidation. All that is past. It has
no place in an age in which the panacea for all ills is supposed to be a constitutional amendment, or at least an act of Congress. The federal courts
have been forced to abandon their air of superiority and aloofness and to step
down where the average business man and the average lawyer (to say nothing
of the average police court character) can view them in the same light as the
state courts of equivalenf jurisdiction. Viewing them, he observes a striking
likeness of some features; albeit, the same striking differences and contrasts
which so often appear among relatives. No matter where he is located, or
how narrow the field of his practice, no lawyer of today can safely ignore
the matters of federal jurisdiction and procedure, on the theory that he is
not likely to have to deal with them. This change in the relative importance
of state and federal courts has led to the establishment of courses in federal
procedure in most standard law schools, and without question the end is not
yet.
The author of the book under review has recognized the inherent difficulty of classifying and treating the "vast mass of details of practice." In
the opinion of the present reviewer he has solved this problem in the only
effective way, by disregarding these details in his arrangement, and allowing
them to appear only as incidents in the consideration of cases dealing with
the more fundamental principles. However, there is a difference between disregarding these details in the arrangement of a work, and omitting all treatment of them. The book conforms to the orthodox idea that a case-book must
contain nothing but cases, and as a consequence the inistructor using it must
either leave these incidental details of practice to be drawn out by the students
unaided, or devote time to them at the expense of the fundamental principles
intended to be developed. It seems to the writer of this review that the
insertion of summaries and notes in the form of text would have made the
book a more effective instrument for the teaching of procedure. Indeed, it
seems to be coming to be recognized that the inclusion of such material, at
least, in case-books on adjective law, is not entirely sacrilege. In this connection it might be observed that there is not, in the work under consideration,
sufficient emphasis on what is sometimes termed the mechanics of practice.
For example, in the chapter on Removal of Causes there is a rather exhaustive
treatment of the jurisdictional side, but nothing whatever as to how a cause
may be removed. A summary or text treatment of this phase of the matter
would have added to the practical value of the work without in any way detracting from that phase which the compiler desired to stress.
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The above criticisms are really directed not so much at the book itself,
as at the system which required it to take that form or be viewed as unorthodox. The book consists of well-selected cases, admirably arranged and edited,
and without doubt is capable of being made the basis of an effective course
in federal procedure. The treatment of the Conformity Act, one of the most
difficult phases of federal procedure, while occupying less than fifty pages,
is comprehensive and entirely adequate to develop the underlying principles
and to illustrate the most important limitations. A valuable feature is the
inclusion, in the appendix, of those articles of the Constitution bearing on
the subject, and of the statutes involved. Conceivably, the book would have
been more usable if some system of direct reference to these statutes in the
appendix had been incorporated.
Wayne G. Cook.
University of Iowa Law School.

SouRCEs OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

By C. Ellis Stevens.

New ed. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1927. Pp. xix, 313.
Anyone who would enjoy more than a very moderate acquaintance with
the Constitution of the United States must investigate its sources. There is
perhaps no branch of learning which demands so imperatively a study of its
history as does the Law. This is especially true of Constitutional Law. Without a strong personal grasp of the events and problems of the past, no student
can hope for a correct appraisal of the present or an intelligent outlook upon
the future.
Our Constitution is written in simple language, but in its principles are
the fundamentals, the vital elements of human government. Just as the structures which span our great water courses represent a development which began
before Xenophon constructed a bridge to facilitate the retreat of the Ten
Thousand, so does our Constitution represent a growth which began before
Hammurabi reigned in united Babylon.
Mr. Stevens, in his small volume, makes no attempt to investigate remote
sources, but considers only the more immediate with reference to English and
Colonial history. Whilst many of our most fundamental principles of government were old before England had a name, the fact remains that our debt to
English law and English experience is practically incalculable. The author has
done valuable work in his limited field. His chapter on the American Executive
is perhaps the most valuable, especially since here, more than in the other
chapters, his treatment is distinctive and out of the hard-worn path.
The publishers have done a commendable service in presenting this volume
anew to the public. It is to be regretted however, that they did not take
notice of some important changes which have been made since the author wrote
the preface to his second edition in i894. For instance, on page 158 after
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referring to the fact that President Washington was accustomed to communicate with Congress by oral address, the writer says: "Jefferson however, filled
with theories of democracy imbibed from France, introduced the practice of
sending written messages, which has- since been continued." This was, of
course, true in 1894. The omission on the part of the publishers in this instance may be of little consequence, but another failure to bring the volume
up to date is more glaring. In Appendix 4, the text of the Constitution is
printed, but the amendments adopted since 1894, that is the i6th, 17th, i8th and
i9th, are omitted. When one finds a copy of the Constitution in a book printed
in 1927, he reasonably expects to see the document in its entirety, not as it
was thirty years ago. Although the publishers have thus failed to bring the
volume up to date, it is nevertheless a valuable one and will amply repay a
careful reading.
Linis A. Lilly.
St. Louis University.
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